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Non-Technical Summary  
While profits are taxed, no immediate tax refund is granted if a corporation suffers losses. 
Losses can only be used to offset profits generated in other periods or by affiliated companies. 
The tax loss offset rules, however, significantly differ across countries. While only some 
countries grant a loss carryback option, a loss carryforward is always possible. Yet, in some 
countries the intertemporal loss offset is subject to time restrictions. Moreover, several 
countries have a group taxation which allows consolidation of profits and losses across 
affiliated firms. 
This paper analyzes in how far multinational firms factor the differently strict tax loss 
treatment rules into their investment decisions. We consider two effects of tax loss treatment. 
First, we analyze whether the various types of conceivable loss offset provisions affect 
investment decisions when firms expect potential losses someday in the future. Secondly, we 
consider subsidiaries which have already suffered losses and analyze if their investment 
behavior changes once they have loss carryforwards.  
For the empirical analysis, we use data of German multinationals taken from the 
Microdatabase Direct Investment of the German Central Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank). Our 
data allows a comparison of the investment behavior of multinational subsidiaries in 41 host 
countries during the years 1996-2007.  
Our results suggest that the existence of a group taxation rule in particular exerts a positive 
influence on investments, which is even stronger for firms with a relatively high probability to 
suffer losses. Regarding the investment structure, a group taxation regime makes 
multinational groups distribute their investments across more subsidiaries. Concerning the 
intertemporal loss offset, we find that investment levels are significantly affected by tax loss 
offset rules if a subsidiary operates in an industry where the probability to suffer losses is 
high. Interestingly, a broad time limit until unutilized losses forfeit, however, does not seem 
to hinder investments.  
In the second part of our analysis, we trace effects of existing tax loss carryforwards on 
investment decisions. Our results suggest that the tax rate elasticity of investment actually is 
significantly reduced if a subsidiary can offset taxable profits with losses carried forward from 
previous periods. 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Gewinne von Unternehmen werden im Jahr ihrer Realisierung besteuert. Verluste dagegen 
können steuerlich nur im Rahmen von Verlustverrechnungsregeln genutzt werden. Diese 
Regeln variieren von Land zu Land und über die Zeit. Nur einige wenige Länder gewähren 
einen Verlustrücktrag, ein Verlustvortrag hingegen ist überall möglich. In manchen Ländern 
ist der Verlustvortrag jedoch zeitlich beschränkt. Neben diesen intertemporalen Regeln zur 
Verlustverrechnung, bieten manche Länder ein Gruppenbesteuerungssystem, welches die 
Verrechnung von Gewinnen und Verlusten zwischen verbundenen Unternehmen ermöglicht. 
Dieses Papier untersucht, inwieweit Unternehmen die unterschiedlich ausgestalteten 
Verlustverrechnungsregeln bei ihrem Investitionsverhalten berücksichtigen. Dabei betrachten 
wir zwei grundsätzliche Effekte der steuerlichen Verlustverrechnung. Erstens untersuchen 
wir, wie die unterschiedlichen Typen der Verlustverrechnung das Investitionsverhalten von 
Firmen beeinflussen, die potenziell mit zukünftigen Verlusten rechnen. Zweitens betrachten 
wir Tochtergesellschaften, die bereits Verluste erlitten haben und analysieren, ob sie ihr 
Investitionsverhalten angesichts der vorliegenden Verlustvorträge ändern. 
Als Datengrundlage der empirischen Analyse dient die Direktinvestitionsdatenbank der 
Deutschen Bundesbank. Sie erlaubt den Vergleich des Investitionsverhaltens von 
multinationalen Tochterkapitalgesellschaften in 41 Ländern im Zeitraum 1996-2007.  
Unsere empirischen Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass insbesondere die Verfügbarkeit einer 
Gruppenbesteuerung das Investitionsverhalten positiv beeinflusst. Bei Firmen mit einem 
relativ hohen Verlustrisiko ist dieser Effekt besonders stark ausgeprägt. Hinsichtlich der 
Investitionsstruktur führt ein Gruppenbesteuerungssystem dazu, dass Investitionen über mehr 
Tochtergesellschaften gestreut werden. Im Hinblick auf die intertemporale 
Verlustverrechnung zeigt sich, dass insbesondere solche Firmen deutlich auf die 
Regelungsausgestaltung reagieren, die in Branchen mit hohem Verlustrisiko operieren. Eine 
zeitliche Begrenzung des Verlustvortrags scheint keinen negativen Einfluss auf Investitionen 
auszuüben, sofern der Vortragszeitraum hinreichend lang ist. 
Im zweiten Teil unserer Analyse betrachten wir dann die Effekte existierender 
Verlustvorträge auf das Investitionsverhalten. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die 
Steuersatzelastizität der Investitionen signifikant sinkt, wenn ein Unternehmen seine Gewinne 
mit Verlustvorträgen aus vergangenen Jahren verrechnen kann.   
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1. Introduction 
 
Losses gain increased attention in times of economic crises. In such situations, countries 
support their banks and industrial enterprises. Grants are provided in the assumption that in 
the middle and long run, the respective company will recover and be able to repay the 
support. This is public interference in the face of private losses. What seems new has 
traditionally been embedded in the tax system of many states. By granting tax credits or 
reimbursing previously paid taxes for suffered losses, the state exerts an insurance function. 
Income taxation can therefore serve as a kind of automatic stabilizer (Devereux and Fuest, 
2009; Buettner and Fuest, 2010). In this paper, we analyze the investment effects of tax loss 
treatment from the perspective of the potential beneficiary: the private company.  
 
While profits are taxed, no immediate tax refund is granted if a corporation suffers losses. 
Losses can only be used to offset profits generated in other periods or by affiliated companies. 
The tax loss offset rules, however, significantly differ between countries. Almost all countries 
offer the opportunity to carry losses forward to subsequent periods. Across countries, the time 
span for a loss carryforward varies between two years and indefinitely. Moreover, a few 
countries also grant a loss carryback. Besides offering the possibility to shift losses along the 
time dimension, some countries also enable the offset of profits and losses among companies 
belonging to the same group. Interestingly, there is an overall tendency of relaxing the loss 
offset provisions during the last decade. While in 1996 31 out of 41 considered countries 
restricted the loss carryforward, in 2007 only 25 countries did so. The same holds true for the 
group taxation regimes which were granted in only 22 out of the 41 countries in 1996 but in 
27 countries in 2007. 
 
We aim at analyzing whether multinational firms structure their investments based on tax loss 
treatment rules. The different loss offset provisions, profit histories and particularly different 
probabilities to suffer losses provide for considerable variation for an empirical study. 
Multinational companies face the different tax loss offset rules and might consider the tax 
treatment when deciding on investments. The basic question to be answered is going to be if 
the tax loss treatment in the host country exerts an impact on investment decisions of 
subsidiaries. We analyze this question for two scenarios, regarding the investment impact of 
potential and of present losses. First, we look at how companies structure their investments in 
the general perception of potential future losses. In doing so, we focus on the size and 
structure of investments potentially generating losses in the future. Thereafter, we analyze 
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how subsidiaries react once they have already suffered losses and trace the determinants of 
investments in the presence of loss carryforwards. The policy implications might differ 
depending on which of the two strands is covered. A favorable tax loss treatment is expected 
to encourage multinational firms to invest more in that respective country. When taking 
account of the fact that firms are in different positions due to their respective loss history, the 
setup of the loss treatment rule naturally exerts effects on competition.   
 
Our analysis relates to several previous empirical studies dealing with the impact of tax loss 
treatment on investment. Literature on this topic is comprehensive and can also be structured 
into two strands: investment aspects in sight of potential future losses and investment aspects 
in sight of present losses. Generally, there are numerous analytical papers, but empirical 
literature relating to investment aspects in sight of potential future losses is still rare. Early 
empirical studies by Hall and Jorgenson (1967) and by Cummins, Hassett and Hubbard 
(1996) suggest that firms react to loss offset restrictions by structuring their investments in a 
way that they can eventually net profits and losses. In their thorough empirical analysis, 
Devereux, Keen and Schiantarelli (1994) specifically trace the effects of restrictions on 
intertemporal loss offsetting using a panel of UK companies. While they conclude that 
including tax law asymmetries in a model does not improve its predictive power concerning 
investments, they also indicate that further research based on better micro data providing for 
more variation might possibly reveal that tax asymmetries have a more powerful impact on 
investment behavior.  
 
For about two decades, the treatment of existing losses and the reactions of corporations have 
been analyzed empirically. Auerbach and Poterba (1987) present a comprehensive study 
based on Compustat data from 1981 to 1984. Besides concluding on aspects of loss 
carryforwards and financing, they reveal the concentration of losses in specific industries. The 
fact that tax loss treatment seems to differ in importance for firms depending on their 
respective industry has also been outlined in later studies by Cooper and Boynton (2004)1 and 
by Altshuler et al. (2008).2 We will elaborate on this variance in our empirical approach. 
                                                 
1 The study by Cooper and Boynton (2004) is based on data from the Internal Revenue Service. It concludes that 
particularly the housing and the financial industry would benefit from the liquidity effect provided by 
extending the carryback from 2 to 5 years. Graham and Kim (2009) replicate their work by applying 
Compustat data and arrive at comparable results. 
2 Altshuler et al. (2008) trace the losses of the 2001 recession and distinguish by industries. Papers by Devereux 
(1989), Aarbu and MacKie-Mason (2003) and Cooper and Knittel (2006) also provide valuable insights that 
firms seem to structure their investments in a way that they can recover tax losses before they expire. A recent 
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In this paper, we aim at analyzing empirically the investment effects of tax loss treatment. Our 
empirical analysis is based on a rich firm level dataset on German multinationals provided by 
the German Central Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank). The international variation in tax loss 
treatment is crucial for our analysis. We start with an analysis of effects when firms anticipate 
different tax treatments of potential future losses. First, we trace the effect of tax loss 
treatment on the amount of investments. We suppose that a company with a high probability 
to make losses will invest less if tax loss offsetting is restricted. Regarding the loss offset 
among affiliated companies, this is the case when no form of group loss offsetting is provided 
for. Our results suggest that the existence of a group taxation rule exerts a positive influence 
on investments, which is even stronger for firms with a relatively high probability to suffer 
losses. Concerning the intertemporal loss offset, we consider if there is no opportunity to 
carry back losses or a loss carryforward is limited. We find a significant influence if we 
consider the variation in industry probability to suffer losses in some years. Investment levels 
are significantly affected by tax loss offset rules if a subsidiary operates in an industry in 
which the probability to suffer losses is high. Moreover, we build on the strong results for a 
group taxation provision by taking a closer look at it. We analyze whether the possibility to 
offset losses among affiliated firms has an impact on the way companies structure their 
investments. Our results suggest that the number of subsidiaries per country, established by a 
multinational group, is indeed higher in those countries providing rules for loss consolidation 
between affiliated companies. If no group tax regime is available, multinationals tend to pool 
all activities carried in a host country within one subsidiary to ensure loss offsetting with 
profits from other activities. 
 
In the second part of our analysis, we trace effects of existing tax loss carryforwards on 
investments. More precisely, we analyze to what extent the detrimental influence of a higher 
tax rate on investments is mitigated by an existing loss carryforward. Taking into account that 
future profits could effectively remain free of tax, existing losses should increase the quantity 
of investments and reduce the tax elasticity of investment. Our results suggest that, in fact, the 
tax rate elasticity of investment is significantly reduced if a subsidiary can offset current 
taxable profits with losses carried forward from previous periods. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section we provide an overview 
of previous literature dealing with the effects of tax loss treatment and derive empirically 
                                                                                                                                                        
study of Edgerton (2009) shows that in the US, existing loss carryforwards limit the benefits of a newly 
granted bonus depreciation. 
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testable hypotheses. Thereafter, the data is presented in Section 3. In Section 4, we show 
regression results concerning the impact of tax loss treatment on investment behavior of firms 
which potentially will have losses. Section 5 presents empirical results on the effects of 
existing loss carryforwards. Finally, Section 6 concludes.  
 
2.  Investment Impact of Tax Loss Treatment  
 
Basically, two effects of tax loss treatment can be distinguished. On the one hand, firms make 
their investment decisions in the face of potential future losses. Then, the various types of 
conceivable loss offset provisions should affect investment decisions. On the other hand, 
existing loss carryforwards resulting from losses in the past should affect the tax rate-
elasticity of current investment decisions. Therefore, we follow the two strands found in the 
literature and distinguish between the impact of potential future losses and of existing losses. 
While the former case includes effects of tax loss regulations on all corporations potentially 
expecting losses, the latter only considers firms that have already suffered losses in the past 
and therefore have a loss carryforward. 
 
2.1 Potential Losses 
 
Tax Loss Treatment and Investments  
 
If a company expects losses in the future, the loss treatment for tax purposes should affect the 
investment decision. Thus, it is not the subsidiary’s tax status at the point of the investment 
decision that matters, but the country’s tax regulations applicable to all companies and the 
firm’s probability to suffer losses someday. An early fundamental paper on the impact of 
future potential losses is the work by Domar and Musgrave (1944). They compare the 
attractiveness of a riskless and a risky investment and analyze the influence of a tax loss 
treatment on an investor’s readiness to assume risk. They conclude that, theoretically, a more 
generous loss treatment leads to a higher risk assumption.  
 
Whenever a general full loss offset is denied, profits and losses are treated asymmetrically 
from a tax point of view. The theoretical implications of such asymmetries in tax loss 
treatment have been shown by Majd and Myers (1987) as well as Niemann (2008) for 
intertemporal loss offsets and by Donnelly and Young (2002) regarding the netting of losses 
within groups. All of these studies find a detrimental effect on investments caused by 
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unfavorable tax loss treatment - only the degree of the impact varies depending on which 
particular rule is regarded.3 
 
The aspect of risk plays a crucial role in considering potential relationships between taxation 
and investments. The readiness to make risky investments might be influenced by the way 
profits are taxed and potential losses are considered. There has been a vivid discussion on 
taxation and risk in the literature. Mossin (1968), Näslund (1968) and Mintz (1981) analyze 
taxation and risk-taking. They conclude that in the full loss offset case, higher taxation 
increases risk averse investors’ readiness to take risks, while in other settings the influence is 
ambiguous. Feldstein (1969) and Stiglitz (1969) by contrast oppose these analyses. According 
to them, no completely general theoretical assertion is possible and taxation might very well 
lead to risk reduction. 
 
Eeckhoudt and Hansen (1982) pay particular attention to a partial loss offset and conclude 
that tightening it need not reduce the readiness to take risks. While MacKie-Mason (1990) 
stresses the potential benefits of nonlinear elements in the tax system, Eeckhoudt et al. (1997) 
point at supposed detrimental aspects. They show analytically that a tax regime restricting 
loss offsets lowers or even entirely abolishes the demand for risky investments of an 
otherwise risk-neutral firm. They conclude that the ratio of gross profit and the amount of tax 
exemption determines in how far risk aversion scales with gross profits.  
 
All in all, the previous literature on risk-taking has found fairly clear predictions in a full loss 
offset scenario. In the real world, however, we find partial loss offsets with different degrees 
of tightness. Given the lack of a general theory on these real-world settings, an empirical test 
on how tax loss treatment affects investments, particularly embracing the aspect of risk, gains 
more importance. Therefore, we will analyze how the tax loss treatment of potential losses 
affects the size and structuring of investments of multinational firms.  
 
The tax loss treatment differs among countries. While in almost all countries losses can be 
carried forward to subsequent fiscal years, only a few countries allow a loss carryback. 
                                                 
3 Several works have shown that in an asymmetric tax system, counterbalancing rules can at least partly re-    
establish neutrality. Fane (1987), for example, suggests grossing up tax credits and liabilities by a risk-free 
interest rate and guaranteeing their consistency over time. By applying a real options approach, Niemann 
(1999) shows that there is a neutral depreciation schedule depending on the respective tax system. According 
to Panteghini (2005), neutrality can be approached by adjusting the firm’s tax base depending on its level of   
returns. 
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Consequently, the value of the insurance provided by a tax loss offset regime differs among 
locations. While Domar and Musgrave (1944) discuss the loss offset provision in a rather 
general way, Barlev and Levy (1975) distinguish between the carryforward and the carryback 
provision. They show that the expiration of a loss carryforward essentially depends as much 
on the size of the loss suffered as on the sequence of consecutive profits and losses. They 
conclude from their analysis that a loss carryback provision is very valuable for increasing the 
probability of a successful offset, whereas the difference in effect between a limited and an 
unlimited loss carryforward is negligible.  
 
A loss carryback results in an immediate cash inflow in form of a tax refund. Moreover, the 
past company results are well known and the consideration of an insecure future does not 
apply. Therefore, a loss carryback option for tax purposes should influence the investment 
decision even more strongly than an option to net profits and losses sometime in the future. 
The longer the granted carryback period, the stronger is the insurance. However, a carryback 
option effectively leads to tax refunds only if the subsidiary was profitable in the past.  
 
It seems reasonable to suppose that the relevance of tax loss treatment differs among firms. 
We assume materialized losses to indicate that in the respective industry the general 
possibility of suffering losses is more strongly considered. Tax loss offsetting rules might be 
particularly important for firms having a high probability to suffer losses in some years. 
Taking into account the reasoning and findings by Auerbach and Poterba (1987) and Altshuler 
et al. (2008), we expect a particular effect of favorable tax loss treatment on firms engaging in 
very cyclical industries. Based on these considerations, we set up the following hypothesis: 
 
H1:  The option of a loss carryback should foster investment because the tax 
refund serves as an insurance against part of the losses that are potentially 
to be suffered. The carryback option should particularly foster investing by 
firms that have a high probability to make losses. 
 
As mentioned above, only a few countries offer a loss carryback but all countries allow a 
carryforward of losses. Some countries, however, limit the maximum time span losses can be 
carried forward. The shorter the maximum time span which is provided for such intertemporal 
shifts, the higher is the risk of not being able to offset the losses. It can be assumed that 
companies invest less in countries where the time span potential losses can be carried forward 
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is limited. Once again, this consideration should particularly prevail for companies 
anticipating a high probability of suffering losses in several consecutive periods. Concerning 
the limitations of a loss carryforward, we set up the following hypothesis: 
 
H2:  A smaller maximum number of years until the expiry of a loss carryforward 
should exert a detrimental effect on investment. The impact of limitations of 
a loss carryforward should be more pronounced for firms having a high 
probability of making losses. 
 
Loss offsetting along the time dimension is relevant when a single subsidiary is analyzed in an 
isolated way. If, however, a parent company has more than one subsidiary in a country, an 
offset among these different tax subjects might be attainable. This mitigates the need for 
profits earned by the loss making subsidiary itself to offset the loss. The major requirement 
for such an offset is a group taxation regime that allows the consolidation of profits and losses 
between affiliated companies. Different kinds of group taxation regimes such as group 
consolidation, group loss transfer, or consortium relief can be observed.4 Despite differences 
in the respective setup, all these group taxation regimes enable the netting of profits and 
losses across group members. If a group taxation regime is in place, the risk that a loss forfeits 
is considered to be lower than if the intersubjective loss offset is denied. These considerations 
lead to the following hypothesis:  
 
H3:  A group taxation regime should foster investments. The positive investment 
effect of a group taxation regime should be more pronounced for firms 
having a high probability of making losses.  
 
Group Taxation and Structure of Activities  
 
If a country provides tax loss consolidation rules, a group could structure its investments by 
means of different separate legal entities. A multinational firm can split up the investments 
according to risks or business segments and in doing so benefits from limited liability. A well 
structured group of several subsidiaries in a country is likely to be appreciated by providers of 
capital. Becker and Fuest (2007) show analytically that symmetric taxation alone might 
                                                 
4 In a consolidation system, the financial statements of companies belonging to the same group are either made 
up together or merged at the end of the fiscal year. When there is a system of group contribution, the profitable 
subsidiary is allowed to contribute a part or all of its profits to the subsidiary which suffered a loss. 
Correspondingly, losses are transferred among subsidiaries in a group relief system. In effect, all of these three 
systems enable the netting of profits and losses of different tax subjects.  
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ensure only partial neutrality because aspects of limited liability have to be taken into 
account.5 In a group relief system, for example, losses can be offset for tax purposes while 
there is no need to effectively compensate the loss suffered by an affiliated company. Thus, 
the advantage of a possible tax loss offset comes free of any clearing requirements. In 
countries without a group taxation regime, however, the only way to ensure loss offsetting 
between different parts of the firm is incorporating all business activities in one legal entity. 
Therefore, we set up the following hypothesis regarding the impact of a group taxation regime 
on the structuring of investments: 
 
H4: The number of subsidiaries per country established by a parent company 
should be higher in those countries providing consolidation of taxable 
profits and losses of affiliated firms. 
 
2.2 Existing Loss Carryforwards 
 
The tax treatment of losses should also affect investment decisions if a firm has already 
suffered losses and therefore has a loss carryforward. As derived analytically by Auerbach 
(1986), a loss carryforward might foster investments. Auerbach (1986) analyzes the effects of 
tax law asymmetries and finds different effects of a loss carryforward on investments, 
depending on its size and the profitability of a firm. A small loss carryforward should hinder 
investments. A bigger loss carryforward is supposed to give the advantage of temporarily 
setting the firm in a tax exempt position. If a firm has a loss carryforward, returns to 
investment can be credited against the losses carried forward. Thus, a firm with a loss 
carryforward is, to a certain extent, tax exempt. If we only consider the present and possible 
future status of a company and disregard the past, then the firm with a loss carryforward is 
supposed to invest more than a firm without the opportunity to reduce its future tax base. 
Given that there are sufficient funds to invest, this should result in an investment exceeding 
the one in a world without taxation or with a perfect loss offset.6  
Nevertheless, there are also arguments suggesting a lower level of investment if a company 
has a loss carryforward. A company showing a loss carryforward has suffered losses in the 
                                                 
5 The influence of limited liability on risk-taking is widely discussed in the empirical finance literature. See Esty 
(1998), Ang et al. (2000), Bitler et al. (2005), Kose et al. (2008) and Laeven and Levine (2009) for further 
insights. Due to the fact that we only consider corporations and disregard partnerships in this study, there is no 
variation in terms of liability limitations.  
6 In a subsequent study, Altshuler and Auerbach (1990) use tax return data for U.S. nonfinancial corporations 
and find an increasing amount of unused tax credits. Given the absence of investment incentives during the 
analyzed period, they base this rise in a restriction on the ability for firms to obtain refunds for tax losses. 
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past and therefore might lack internal financing. This could have a detrimental effect on 
investment levels. Moreover, in the case of multinational firms, this could lead to less 
investment if local managers have to run for capital provided by the parent company and 
losses signal that the business model of the subsidiary is not successful.  
 
H5:  Based on the tax effect, an existing loss carryforward should result in a 
higher investment level. If liquidity or signaling effects prevail, the effect 
of a loss carryforward on the investment level should be negative. 
 
Moreover, the level of the corporate tax rate does not affect investment decisions anymore as 
a profit has a more positive net effect for the company with the loss carryforward. The 
company simply does not have to pay the entire profit tax, depending on the amount of past 
losses. While previous studies find negative effects of the corporate tax rate on investment 
decisions (for a survey on the tax effect on investments of multinationals see De Mooij and 
Ederveen, 2003), this general relationship should be alleviated once losses are present. In the 
presence of a loss carryforward, the taxrate elasticity of investments should be lower in 
absolute value, due to the fact that the company can net its carryforward against future profits, 
which then stay effectively untaxed. This supposed relationship has been worked out 
analytically by Creedy and Gemmel (2008).  
 
In some countries, an alternative minimum tax requires that a company pays a minimum 
amount of taxes in a certain year although it has no taxable profits. Then, a subsidiary is 
obliged to pay a minimum amount of taxes, albeit a sufficient amount of losses carried 
forward is available to offset current profits. Therefore, the application of an alternative 
minimum tax countervails the effects of an existing loss carryforward on the tax rate elasticity 
of investment decisions. We set up the following testable hypothesis: 
 
H6:  An existing loss carryforward should reduce the tax rate elasticity of 
investment decisions. A minimum tax should counteract this effect. 
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3.  Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
The empirical analysis uses the MiDi database for multinationals, which is provided by the 
German Central Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank). The comprehensive micro database covers 
information on both direct investment positions held in Germany by foreign companies and 
direct investment positions of German enterprises held abroad. The data allows us to trace 
groups and their affiliates over time. Panel data is currently available for the period from 1996 
to 2007. The data collection is imposed by German law which requires reporting for certain 
international transactions and positions.7 This aspect of MiDi is worth emphasizing as we are 
thus able to observe virtually all major German outbound investments. In this study, we only 
analyze subsidiaries which are located outside Germany and are owned by a group having its 
headquarters in Germany.8 Moreover, we exclude subsidiaries from the financial industry. We 
consider a sample of German subsidiaries located in 41 countries. This consists of the four 
BRIC countries9, 29 countries which were members of the OECD in 200710, and the eight EU 
member states which were not OECD countries.11 
 
In our basic regressions analyzing effects on investment decisions, we consider majority-
owned and directly-held subsidiaries.12 Our basic sample consists of 51,933 observations of 
10,677 subsidiaries belonging to 4,142 German parent companies. In addition, we consider a 
different sample when testing Hypothesis 4, which deals with the impact of group taxation 
regimes on group structures. Since we analyze group structures, we only regard 100 percent 
participations but also include indirectly-held subsidiaries. In this case, we can use more than 
80,000 observations for our regressions dealing with the fourth hypothesis. Note that this 
higher number of observations includes more than 15,000 observations of holding companies 
                                                 
7 Sec. 26 of Foreign Trade and Payments Act (Aussenwirtschaftsgesetz) in connection with Foreign Trade and 
Payments Regulation (Aussenwirtschaftsverordnung). Since 2002, FDI has to be reported if the participation is 
10% or more and the balance-sheet total of the respective foreign investment in Germany exceeds 3 million 
Euros. For details see Lipponer (2008). Though previous years showed lower threshold levels, we apply this 
one uniformly for all years in the panel. For general interpretations of the dataset from a tax and finance 
perspective see Mintz and Weichenrieder (2010). 
8  We exclude observations from mining, agriculture, non-profit and membership organizations because special 
tax regimes may be available. Furthermore, we exclude observations whose German parent is not an 
incorporated and legally independent entity, as well as subsidiaries which are not legally independent. 
9 The BRIC countries are Brasil, Russia, India and China. 
10 These covered OECD countries in 2007 are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, The Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, The 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, The Slovak Republic, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, The United Kingdom and The United States. 
11 These EU countries are Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovenia and Romania. 
12 We restrict our basic sample to directly-held subsidiaries because more complex ownership structures might 
be associated with enhanced tax planning opportunities. Wamser (2008), for example, shows that the tax 
elasticity of investment decisions is different in the case of indirectly-held subsidiaries. 
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which are not included when it comes to the other hypotheses due to their general lack of 
fixed and intangible assets. 
 
As dependent variable, we particularly consider the investment level in fixed assets of each 
subsidiary. Moreover, in the additional regressions dealing with group structures, the number 
of legally independent and incorporated subsidiaries held by the same German parent 
company in one host country serves as the dependent variable. In addition, we transform the 
number of subsidiaries held by a German parent in a certain host country to a binary variable 
having the value one if the number of subsidiaries is more than one, and zero otherwise.  
 
The firm-level data provides information on the existence of current losses and losses carried 
forward. First, we use this information to construct a variable which indicates the probability 
to make losses for subsidiaries engaged in the same industry. This variable LRI is the loss 
ratio per industry measured as the ratio of observable loss situations in a certain industry in a 
year divided by all subsidiaries regarding that industry in that certain year. A higher value can 
serve as a proxy of a higher probability of making losses. In doing so, we identify firms which 
are likely to benefit more from a favorable tax treatment of losses.13 Across the time 
dimension of our sample, the overall mean value of LRI rises from 0.264 in 1998 to its 
maximum of 0.291 in 2001 and then declines to 0.218 in 2007. A closer look shows cyclical 
changes of LRI in some industries while in other industries the probability to suffer a loss is 
less affected by changes in the overall economy. The food industry is an example for an 
industry which is almost unaffected by cyclical changes. Its value of LRI was 0.261 in 2001 
and 0.262 in 2007. By contrast, the industry of data processing shows significant fluctuation 
in LRI of, for example, 0.473 in 2001 and 0.255 in 2007.14 Secondly, we construct a dummy 
variable LCF Exists indicating whether the respective subsidiary has accumulated losses in 
the past that can be utilized for an intertemporal offset.15 Notably, almost 30% of all 
observations show a loss carryforward.  
 
                                                 
13 Alvarez and Koskela (2008) use volatility measures when analyzing the readiness to take risks. We will apply 
this convincing method here in categorizing industries ex post on the basis of their volatility in terms of 
positive and negative business outcomes. 
14 The subsidiaries showing the highest values of LRI across all years are those operating in the tourism industry 
(0.417), the housing industry (0.400) and the restaurant industry (0.398). Low values can be observed in the 
industries of advertising (0.115), market and opinion research (0.149) and the pharmaceutical industry (0.199). 
15 Our firm-level data only provides financial accounting data. We use the information on the existence of a loss 
carryforward taken from financial accounting as a proxy for the existence of a tax loss carryforward. 
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Furthermore, our study rests on the application of tax variables described in the following. 
First of all, we consider the statutory corporate tax rates for each host country in each year. 
Secondly, in our case, the tax loss treatment regulations are of major importance. The time 
spans in which losses can be carried back or forward differ strongly both between countries 
and over time. The maximum loss carryback period is six years; but only six of the analyzed 
countries offer a loss carryback at all. The carry backward period amounts to two and a half 
years on average across those countries providing for such a rule. Table 7 in the Annex shows 
the countries where it is generally possible to carryback losses. We form a dummy variable 
Carryback Option which equals one if a host country provides for a carryback rule and the 
subsidiary had profits in the past. 16 Therefore, the dummy variable is one if the subsidiary is 
in effect individually able to carryback losses.  
 
In 2007, the loss carryforward is limited in time in 25 countries while there are no limitations 
in 16 out of the 41 countries considered. However, eight of the latter countries restrict the loss 
carryforward during some of the covered years. Seven of those 25 countries which restrict the 
loss carryforward grant a limit of at least ten years in 2007. In five countries, a loss can no 
longer be utilized after seven to nine years; one country shows a barrier of six years and 
twelve countries set their barriers at five years. Please refer to Table 5 in the Annex for a 
detailed overview of the loss carryforward provisions. First, we use a dummy variable LCF 
limited, which is one if the maximum time a loss can be carried forward is limited, otherwise 
it is zero. Secondly, we split up the variable indicating whether the loss carryforward is 
limited. The dummy variable LCF limited ൑ 5 is one if a loss carryforward is limited up to 5 
years while the dummy LCF limited >5 indicates if a loss carryforward is limited but does not 
expire during a time span shorter than 6 years. 
 
Moreover, we consider the possibility to consolidate losses within a group of firms. While 
cross-border loss offset is hardly ever allowed, some host countries offer a loss consolidation 
between affiliated companies located in that respective country. More precisely, 27 of the 41 
considered countries offer the possibility of national group taxation in 2007. Our variable 
Group Taxation shows whether or not such a rule exists in the respective country and year. In 
nine of these countries, the regulations show variation across the considered years. Table 8 in 
the Annex provides further insights in group taxation rules in the analyzed countries. 
Furthermore, we regard the existence of a minimum taxation rule. We consider a binary     
                                                 
16 As only very few countries provide the opportunity for a loss carryback, we do not distinguish between 
different time frames when it comes to loss carryback options. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Definition 
Sample A Sample B 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Fixed Assets Fixed and intangible assets reported in the 
financial statements; measured in EUR '000. 
12,653 75,061 8,931 69,191 
Number  of 
Subsidiaries 
The number of subsidiaries of one German-
based group in one specific country outside 
Germany in a given year.  
  1.353 1.261 
Various Subsidiaries Dummy variable showing if the parent 
company has more than one (1) or only one 
(0) subsidiary in a country in the respective 
year.  
  .179 .383 
Former Profit Dummy variable showing if the company had 
(1) or did not have (0) a profit in the previous 
period.  
.737 .440   
Count Industries Number of industries a group conducts 
business in. This count variable is based on 
the NACE industry classification.  
  2.275 1.660 
Loss Ratio per 
Industry (LRI) 
The loss ratio of the industry, i.e. observed 
losses in a certain industry during a year 
divided by all observations of this industry in 
this year.  
.256 .055   
LCF  Exists Dummy variable showing if the subsidiary 
regarded has (1) or does not have (0) a loss 
carryforward. 
.290 .454   
Tax Rate Statutory profit tax rate  
 
.320 .068 .324 .071 
Carryback Option Dummy variable showing if the company can 
(1) or cannot (0) carryback potential future 
losses. If the variable is 1, the company had 
profits in the past and resides in a country 
offering a loss carryback rule.  
.181 .385   
Group Taxation Dummy variable showing if the country of 
the subsidiary provides (1) or does not 
provide (0) for the netting of profits and 
losses of different legal entities. Group relief, 
group contribution or other consolidation 
rules are considered as equivalents. 
.669 .471 .693 .461 
LCF limited Dummy variable showing if a country limits 
(1) or does not limit (0) the maximum time a 
loss can be carried forward without forfeiting.
.644 .479   
LCF limited  ൑5 Dummy variable showing if there has been a 
maximum loss carryforward period of five or 
less years (1) or if the barrier was broader or 
even nonexistent (0).  
.331 .470   
LCF limited > 5 Dummy variable showing if there has been a 
limited maximum loss carryforward period of 
six or more years (1) or not (0). 
.314 .464   
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Table 1: Continued 
Variable Definition 
Sample A Sample B 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Mintax Dummy variable showing if a country has (1) 
or does not have (0) a minimum taxation rule. 
.229 .420   
GDP Gross Domestic Product measured in billion 
current USD. 
 
1,725 2,979 1,750 3,000 
GDP per Capita Gross Domestic Product per home country 
national; measured in current USD '000. 
24.890 14.464 25.620 14.139 
 
 
Inflation Rate Inflation rate based on consumer prices. .032 .050 .033 .092 
CountryRisk OECD Country Risk Classification Method 
measures the country credit risk. Risk 
categories span from a low credit risk (0) to a 
high credit risk (7).  
.756 1.397 .670 1.358 
Sample A is the basic sample and consists of 51,933 observations. Sample B is applied for Hypothesis 4 and 
consists of 80,282 observations. Firm-specific variables are derived from the MiDi database of the German 
Central Bank. The tax variables are derived from information taken from the IBFD Tax Handbooks and the 
Worldwide Corporate Tax Guides by Ernst & Young. GDP, GDP per Capita and Inflation Rate stem from the 
World Development Indicators, edition 2009. Country Risk is based on information provided by the OECD. 
 
 
variable Mintax which is one if a minimum taxation rule is applied. Table 6 in the Annex 
covers the aspect of an existing minimum taxation across the considered countries and years. 
As non-tax control variables, we apply data from various sources. We use host country GDP, 
GDP per Capita, and the Inflation Rate, all taken from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators. The Country Risk scaling from 0 to 7 with higher values corresponding to higher 
risk is derived from the OECD. Table 1 summarizes all variables employed in this study.  
 
4.  Impact of Tax Treatment of Potential Future Losses 
 
4.1 Tax Loss Treatment and Investment Levels 
 
We start with a test of the hypotheses set up in Section 3.1 dealing with the impact of tax loss 
treatment rules on investments.  
 
Estimation Approach 
As dependent variable we consider the balance sheet item fixed assets of subsidiary i in year t. 
We estimate equations of the following type: 
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ln(Fixed Assets)i, k, t = β0+ β1ln(Fixed Assets)i,t-1+ β2TaxRatei,t+ β3LRIk, t   
+  Xi,tβ4+ δ i + γ t + εi,k,t 
 
First, we take into account the persistence of the fixed assets by using a dynamic model which 
captures adjustment costs (Chirinko, 1993). In this sense, the approach reflects the marginal 
decision of the firm in terms of the scale of investment conditional on the chosen location. 
Moreover, we consider the statutory tax rate, a vector of non-tax controls X and a subsidiary-
specific effect δi as well as a year effect γt. Furthermore, the variable LRI considers the loss 
probability measured by the ratio of loss making companies per year in industry k.  
 
Two aspects of our econometric model are worth mentioning. First, we control for subsidiary-
specific heterogeneity, which is eliminated by taking first differences. Secondly, we capture 
dynamics by including the fixed assets from a previous period. Note that this dynamic 
specification corresponds to the marginal decision of the firm on how much to invest over 
time. Yet, such a specification requires considering that our time-series information is not 
sufficient to avoid what is called a dynamic panel bias (Nickell, 1981). We therefore follow 
the literature and apply the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator suggested by 
Arellano and Bond (1991). We report two-step difference GMM estimations and standard 
errors which are corrected for finite sample bias (Windmeijer, 2005). Lagged levels are used 
to instrument the lagged dependent variable. 
 
As pointed out above, losses can be offset among tax subjects and over time. Therefore, we 
subsequently include the dummy variables described in Section 4, which indicate whether a 
group taxation regime, a loss carryback option or a limitation of the loss carryforward is 
applied in the respective host country. Moreover, each of these variables interacts with the 
loss ratio of the industry. The coefficients of these interaction terms show whether the effects 
of the tax loss treatment rules are more pronounced for subsidiaries that are supposed to have 
a higher probability of suffering losses. 
 
Regression Results 
 
Table 2 shows the regression results dealing with the investment impact of tax loss treatment 
rules. While column (1) shows regression results according to the equation stated above, the 
additional specifications regard the potential effects of the tax loss treatment on investments. 
Apart from coefficient estimates and standard errors, we report the Arellano and Bond (1991) 
(1) 
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test on auto-correlation of residuals. The validity of the GMM-estimator relies on the absence 
of second-order auto-correlation. The numbers shown in Table 2 are p-values, suggesting that 
no significant second-order auto-correlation exists. Finally, the Hansen J-test (Hansen, 1982) 
of over-identifying restrictions indicates that the validity of Fixed Assetsi,t-2  as an additional 
instrument cannot be rejected at any reasonable level of significance. 
 
As found in previous studies, our results confirm that the tax rate has a negative impact on 
investment levels. The point estimator of column (1) suggests that a tax rate which is one 
percentage point higher is associated with 0.325 percent less investment in fixed assets.  
However, this is only a short-run effect. Provided that we employ a dynamic estimation 
approach, the long run effect amounts to -0.543.17 
 
Let us briefly discuss the effects of the control variables. A profit in the former period leads to 
higher investments, which can be attributed to increased liquidity as well as to positive 
signaling effects if local managers run for investment funds provided by the CEO. We do not 
find significant effects for the size of the host country’s local market indicated by the GDP. 
This seems to come as a surprise, but it should, however, be taken into account that we 
estimate in first differences. Therefore, our approach removes time-invariant cross-country 
variations from the regressions. The GDP per capita, which can be interpreted as a proxy of 
labor costs, shows a positive and significant coefficient. This can be explained by the 
substitution effect between labor and capital in the production process. In the face of high 
labor costs, labor is substituted by capital, which is our dependent variable. Regarding the 
country risk, our results suggest that a higher country risk is associated with less investment 
by subsidiaries of German multinationals. Finally, we find a positive effect of the inflation 
rate on investment in fixed assets. This finding can be explained by the advantage of intra-
group exchanges and an increased incentive for real investments as compared to investments 
in the capital market.  
 
Specifications (2) and (3) take into account the influence of a group taxation regime. As the 
regression results in column (2) show, the existence of a group taxation rule exerts a 
significant positive effect on the stock of fixed assets, which is our measure for investments. 
The size of the effect amounts to 0.205, meaning that in a country enabling the netting of 
                                                 
17 By assuming that ln(Fixed Assetsi,t) = ln( Fixed Assetsi,t-1)  in the long-run equilibrium and by rearranging 
Equation (1), the long-run effect can be calculated as β2/(1-β1). Using the point estimators of column (1) in 
Table 2, the long run effect is -0.325 / (1-0.402) = -0.543. 
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profits and losses of different tax subjects belonging to the same group, investments are 20.5 
percent higher than in countries not providing for such a rule. Moreover, we consider the 
probability of making losses by the variable LRI; however, we do not find any statistically 
significant effect for the plain LRI variable. In column (3) we insert an interaction term 
between the dummy variable, indicating that a group taxation regime exists, and the loss ratio 
of the industry. The additional positive coefficient for the interaction suggests that the 
existence of a group taxation regime is even more relevant for subsidiaries facing a relatively 
high risk of suffering losses.  
 
We proceed with an analysis of the inter-temporal tax loss treatment. The hypothesis H1 
states that a company which has the opportunity to carryback potential losses should invest 
more because it does not have to bear the full loss itself. The regression result in column (4) 
indicates that the option of a loss carryback might really exert a positive impact on 
investments; but, as regressions (5) and (6) reveal, this conclusion cannot be drawn once we 
control for a profit in the previous period. These results suggest that it is the previous profit of 
the subsidiary which drives investment. By contrast, the additional opportunity to receive a 
tax refund if losses can be carried back to that previous period has no significant impact on 
investment. Given that the interaction term between the dummy indicating a carryback option 
and the industry-level probability of making losses in column (6) is insignificant, this is also 
true for firms operating in industries with a higher loss probability. It should be mentioned, 
however, that only six of the considered countries allow a loss carryback and that the 
variation across time is limited regarding this aspect (see Table 7 in the Annex). Therefore, 
the results should be interpreted with some caution.  
 
Furthermore, we analyze whether a limitation of the time span a loss can be carried forward 
exerts a negative effect on investment decisions. Column (7) shows a negative, but not 
statistically significant impact of such a barrier on investments. In column (8), we again 
differentiate between firms which are rather unlikely to suffer losses and firms operating in 
industries associated with a high probability of making losses. The interaction term of the 
dummy indicating the existence of a loss carryforward limitation and the loss ratio of the 
industry shows a significant negative coefficient. This means that companies facing a higher 
probability of suffering losses in the future tend to invest less in countries limiting the 
maximum period of a loss carryforward. The observation of a differing effect of the tax loss  
 
18 
 
Table 2: Investment Effects of Tax Loss Treatment Rules
   .(1)  .(2)  .(3)  .(4)  .(5)  .(6)  .(7)  .(8)  .(9) 
ln (Fixed Assetst‐1)  .402***  .403***  .404***  .403***  .402***  .402***  .404***  .404***  .404*** 
(.036)  (.036)  (.036)  (.036)  (.036)  (.036)  (.036)  (.036)  (.036) 
Tax Rate   ‐.325***   ‐.339***  ‐.338***   ‐.341***  ‐.340***  ‐.339***   ‐.347***   ‐.343***  ‐.333***
(.123)  (.123)  (.123)  (.123)  (.123)  (.123)  (.124)  (.124)  (.124) 
LRI  .056  .054   ‐.137   ‐.132   ‐.136   ‐.138   ‐.136  .080  .093 
(.064)  (.065)  (.112)  (.112)  (.112)  (.112)  (.112)  (.155)  (.156) 
Group Taxation  .205***  .129**  .131**  .130**  .133**  .132**  .145**  .151** 
(.059)  (.066)  (.066)  (.066)  (.066)  (.066)  (.067)  (.069) 
(Group Taxation) x LRI        .292**  .289**  .290**  .278**  .291**  .240*  .225* 
      (.127)  (.127)  (.127)  (.131)  (.127)  (.131)  (.132) 
Carryback Option           .033**  .021  .008          
      (.016)  (.017)  (.041)    
(Carryback Option) x LRI           .052    
         (.135)    
LCF limited               ‐.012  .056 
            (.015)  (.035) 
(LCFlimited) x LRI                  ‐.272** 
               (.126) 
LCF limited ൑5              .112*** 
            (.044) 
LCFlimited>5              .015 
            (.037) 
(LCF limited ൑5) x LRI                  ‐.462***
               (.153) 
(LCF limited> 5) x LRI                  ‐.107 
               (.134) 
Former Profit  .018***  .018***  .018***     .015**  .015**  .018***  .018***  .018*** 
(.007)  (.006)  (.006)     (.007)  (.007)  (.006)  (.006)  (.006) 
ln (GDP)  ‐.440  ‐.316  ‐.287  ‐.322  ‐.301  ‐.305  ‐.265  ‐.264  ‐.260 
(.369)  (.371)  (.371)  (.371)  (.371)  (.372)  (.372)  (.372)  (.372) 
ln (GDP per Capita)  .953***  .844**   .810**  .849**   .825**  .830**   .788**   .790**   .780** 
(.370)  (.372)  (.373)  (.372)  (.373)  (.374)  (.374)  (.374)  (.374) 
Inflation Rate  .035*  .036*  .036*  .036*  .036*  .036*  .036*  .036*  .036* 
(.021)  (.021)  (.020)  (.020)  (.020)  (.020)  (.020)  (.020)  (.020) 
Country Risk   ‐.036***   ‐.037***  ‐.036***   ‐.036***  ‐.036***  ‐.036***   ‐.036***   ‐.036***  ‐.035***
(.010)  (.010)  (.010)  (.010)  (.010)  (.010)  (.010)  (.010)  (.010) 
Observations  51,933  51,933  51,933  51,933  51,933  51,933  51,933  51,933  51,933 
Subsidiaries  10,677  10,677  10,677  10,677  10,677  10,677  10,677  10,677  10,677 
Number of IVs  62  63  64  64  65  66  65  66  68 
AR(1) – test  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
AR(2) ‐ test  0.831  0.865  0.875  0.849  0.878  0.878  0.871  0.871  0.869 
Hansen J‐test  0.168  0.170  0.175  0.167  0.175  0.173  0.175  0.177  0.179 
Dependent Variable: ln (Fixed Assets). Year dummies for 1997-2007 are included but not reported. Estimations in 
first differences follow Arellano and Bond (1991). Robust standard errors using the Windmeijer (2005) correction, 
are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** show significance at the level of 10%, 5% and 1 % respectively. Numbers 
reported for the Hansen J-test of overidentification restrictions and for the test of 2nd order auto-correlation (AR(2)) 
are p-values. 
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treatment depending on the respective firm’s industry confirms the analyses by Auerbach and 
Poterba (1987) and by Altshuler et al. (2008). 
 
Finally, in column (9) we distinguish between a short period losses can be carried forward 
(൑ 5 years) and a longer time span until a loss carryforward expires (> 5 years). Only in the 
case of the short carryforward period, we find a statistically significant effect for the 
interaction term with the industry-level loss probability. This means that a tight limit of the 
maximum loss carryforward period exerts a negative impact on investments of firms 
operating in industries where the probability to suffer losses is relatively high. The second 
interaction term covering the product of industry loss ratio with the dummy on observations 
where the carryforward is limited to periods between six and twenty years proves to be 
insignificant. This suggests that it hardly seems to have an impact on investment decisions if 
the loss carryforward is unlimited or if it forfeits after a rather long time span.18 The different 
observable impact of the loss carryforward restriction depending on its severity reflects the 
expectations expressed in the previous literature.19 
 
 
4.2 Group Taxation Regimes and Structure of Activities 
 
Taking into account our strong results for the impact of the existence of a group taxation 
regime on investment decisions, we provide an additional analysis dealing with the impact of 
group taxation regimes on the structure of national subgroups of multinational firms. Here, a 
national subgroup includes all incorporated and wholly-owned subsidiaries located in a 
certain host country and belonging to the same German parent company. Tracing our   
hypothesis H4, we analyze whether the possibility of offsetting profits and losses between 
affiliated subsidiaries affects the legal structures of the activities in a host country.  
 
Estimation Approach 
 
First, we analyze the probability that there are several instead of just one subsidiary 
established by a certain German parent firm in the respective country. As the dependent 
                                                 
18 The counterintuitive positive effect of LCF limited ൑5 only measures a hypothetical fraction of the overall 
effect and will not show this impact in reality. This can be seen by calculating the overall effect. The 1%-
percentile of LRI shows a value of .167. Therefore, the overall effect is about zero for this lower boundary of 
LRI (0.167 x (-0.462) + 1 x 0.112 = 0.03) and negative for the rest of the sample covering industries with a 
higher probability to suffer losses.  
19 While the considerable effect of a severe carryforward limitation confirms the expectations by Eeckhoudt et al. 
(1997), the insignificance of limitations in longer time spans is in line with Barlev and Levy (1975) and 
MacKie-Mason (1990). 
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(3) 
variable, we consider a binary variable indicating if a German parent company has organized 
its activities in a country by more than one subsidiary. If all activities carried out by a group in 
that respective host country are pooled within one subsidiary, the variable is zero.20 
 
Formally, the decision of parent company j to structure its activities in a host country h in year 
t across more than one subsidiary is modeled as a discrete choice decision problem and is 
captured in an econometric model using a standard latent variable framework. Suppose that 
the observable decision to either use more than one subsidiary, ݕ௝௧, or to use only one 
subsidiary is related to the latent predisposition to use more than one subsidiary, ݕ௝௧כ , 
according to ݕ௝௧ ൌ 1ሾݕ௝௧כ ൐ 0ሿ where 1ሾ. ሿ is the indicator function. Suppose furthermore that a 
parent’s predisposition towards using more than one subsidiary per host country is a function 
of the existence of group taxation and a vector X of firm- and host country-specific 
characteristics, a common period-specific effect ߛ௧, an unobservable parent-specific effect ௝ܿ 
and a residual ߝ௝,௛,௧. Choosing a linear specification for the latent variable provides us with 
 
 ݕ௝௧כ ൌ ߚଵܩݎ݋ݑ݌ݐܽݔܽݐ݅݋݊௛,௧ ൅ ௜ܺ௧ߚଶ ൅ ߛ௧ ൅ ௝ܿ ൅ ߝ௝௛௧ 
 
where ߚଵ and ߚଶ are the (vectors of) coefficients to be estimated.  
 
We apply a fixed effects logit model (Chamberlain, 1980) for this estimation.21 The fixed 
effects model assumes that the error ߝ௝,௛,௧ is distributed symmetrically around zero, with 
accumulative distribution function G. The binary response model thus takes the form 
 
ܲ൫ݕ௝௧ ൌ 1หܩݎ݋ݑ݌ݐܽݔܽݐ݅݋݊௛௧, ௝ܺ௧, ௝ܿ൯ ൌ ܲ൫ݕ௝௧כ หܩݎ݋ݑ݌ݐܽݔܽݐ݅݋݊௛௧, ௝ܺ௧, ௝ܿ൯         
ൌ ܩ൫ߚଵܩݎ݋ݑ݌ݐܽݔܽݐ݅݋݊௛,௧ ൅ ௜ܺ௧ߚଶ ൅ ߛ௧ ൅ ௝ܿ൯ 
 
Secondly, the number of subsidiaries held by a German parent company in one country should 
be affected by the existence of a group taxation regime. In this case, we estimate a Poisson 
model. We model the number of subsidiaries n held by a German parent company j in a 
foreign country h. We are interested in the expected value of njh conditional on some control 
                                                 
20 Note that we consider only those host countries where the respective parent company controls at least one 
subsidiary. 
21 A concise introduction to the logit model is provided by Winkelmann (2009). 
 
(2) 
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(4) 
variables Xjh, )( jhjh XnE , where Xjh contains, for instance, the country-specific variable 
indicating if a group taxation regime is applied. One way to express this is to use the 
exponential function as a functional form, )exp()( ' jhjhjh XXnE  . To determine the 
probability of njh given Xjh, we further assume a Poisson distribution with expectation
)exp( '  jhjh X . This implies the following probability function: 
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
     
In order to obtain the Poisson regression model, we use the above functional form for the 
intensity parameter jh  to construct the loglikelihood function. Subsequently, we can 
estimate the vector   using maximum likelihood methods.22 
 
In both the panel logit estimation and the panel Poisson estimation, robustness of the standard 
errors is achieved by bootstrapping standard errors as suggested by Cameron and Trivedi 
(2009).23 We apply fixed effects on the group level. We consider the same set of country level 
control variables as in the regressions dealing with investment decisions. In addition, we use a 
control variable which covers the number of industries the parent company operates in. We 
expect that a group which shows business activities in different industries will automatically 
structure its investments in a more sophisticated way.  
 
Regression Results 
 
Table 3 shows the regression results.  Columns (1) to (4) refer to the panel fixed effects logit 
model, while columns (5) to (8) show the results for the count data model. All of the 
estimations relate to Hypothesis 4, predicting that the possibility to net profits and losses 
within the group should lead to a more distributed structure of investments.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 For general descriptions of the econometric setup of the Poisson estimation we refer to Cameron and Trivedi 
(2009) and Winkelmann (2008). 
23 Following the analysis of Andrews and Buchinsky (2002), we apply 400 repetitions. 
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Table 3:  Effects of Group Taxation Regimes on Group Structures
   .(1)  .(2)  .(3)  .(4)  .(5)  .(6)  .(7)  .(8) 
Group Taxation  .688***  .687***  .159**  .126**  .206***  .203***  .050***  .041*** 
 (.059)   (.058)   (.067)   (.074)   (.019)   (.017)   (.015)   (.014) 
Count Industries     .303***  .316***  .317***     .102***  .100***  .100*** 
    (.030)   (.032)   (.034)      (.008)   (.007)   (.007) 
ln (GDP)     .424***  .421***       .121***  .120*** 
    (.027)   (.026)        (.011)   (.010) 
ln (GDP per Capita)     .272***  .169***       .061***  .035*** 
    (.041)   (.055)        (.009)   (.013) 
Country Risk      ‐.085***          ‐.023*** 
    (.032)          (.007) 
Inflation Rate      ‐.059         .022 
    (.340)         (.023) 
Observations  52,762  52,762  52,762  52,762  80,282  80,282  80,282  80,282 
Groups  1,555  1,555  1,555  1,555  4,787  4,787  4,787  4,787 
Log Likelihood  ‐22,962  ‐22,720  ‐21,648  ‐21,634  ‐89,390  ‐89,059  ‐88,037  ‐88,026 
Columns (1) to (4) show the results of the panel logit estimation.The dependent variable is a binary variable 
indicating if a national subgroup of the same German multinational firm consists of more than one subsidiary. 
Columns (5) to (8) show the results of the Poisson estimation model. The dependent variable is the number of 
subsidiaries belonging to a national subgroup of the same German multinational firm. Fixed effects on group 
level are considered. Year dummies for 1997-2007 are included but not reported. Bootstrapped standard 
errors with 400 repetitions are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** show significance at the level of 10%, 5% 
and 1 % respectively. 
 
 
 
  
First, the results of the logit panel regressions presented in columns (1) – (4) of Table 3 show 
a positive effect for a group taxation regime on the existence of at least two separately 
incorporated subsidiaries of the same German parent company in the respective host country. 
There is a higher probability of establishing more than one subsidiary in a country having a 
group taxation rule than in one lacking such a rule. The size of the estimated coefficient of 
about 0.13 means, that the probability of founding two or more subsidiaries instead of just one 
subsidiary in a specific country rises by 13 percent if this country enables the netting of losses 
between legal entities. Therefore, the results suggest that a group taxation regime influences 
the way multinational groups structure their investments.24 
 
The count model in estimations (5) to (8) leads to comparable results as the logit panel 
regression. According to the full scale estimation (8), about 4% more subsidiaries per group 
can be counted if a group taxation rule is offered.  
 
                                                 
24As a robustness check, we also estimated specifications similar to those presented in Columns (1) – (4) of 
Table 3 using a linear probability model. Those estimations all lead to qualitatively very similar results as the 
panel fixed effects logit model.  
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The control variables show the expected signs. A group having a higher variability of 
different industries establishes more subsidiaries per country. In the full scale estimation (4), 
for example, the size of this effect amounts to 0.317. This means that the probability of 
founding more than one subsidiary in a country increases by 31.7% if the German parent 
company is engaged in one more industry. The market size, approximated by the GDP of the 
host country, has a strong and positive effect on the number of subsidiaries founded there. 
GDP per capita, which serves as an indicator for both labor cost and the purchasing power in 
the host country, also shows a positive sign. The country risk control variable shows the 
expected sign and is significant. Since a higher value of the country risk variable represents a 
higher country risk, the negative sign indicates that the foundation of several instead of just 
one subsidiary is less likely in riskier countries. This finding suggests that a centralized 
structure might be assumed to be superior for avoiding fraud and for monitoring business in 
riskier countries. 
 
5. Effects of Existing Losses Carried Forward and Investment Decisions 
 
In this section, we consider existing losses carried forward. We aim at testing the impact of an 
existing loss carryforward on investment decisions. 
 
Estimation Approach 
In tracing Hypotheses 5 and 6 dealing with the effect of an existing loss carryforward on 
investment decisions, we consider investment levels of each subsidiary as the dependent 
variable. We use an empirical setting which is very similar to the one presented in Section 4.1. 
Again, we consider a dynamic specification that takes into account adjustment costs of the 
fixed asset stocks. As explanatory variables we consider the statutory tax rate, a vector of non-
tax controls and a subsidiary-specific effect δi as well as a year effect γt. Again, we apply the 
GMM-estimator suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991). 
 
Here we pay particular attention to the existence of a loss carryforward. Therefore, we insert 
the dummy variable LCF Exists indicating if the respective subsidiary has accumulated losses 
in the past. Moreover, we consider an interaction term between this indicator variable and the 
tax rate to estimate an impact of an existing loss carryforward on the tax rate elasticity of 
investments. While we expect a negative sign for the statutory tax rate, an adverse effect is 
expected for the interaction because the statutory tax rate should become less important if 
losses carried forward can be used to offset profits arising from new investments.  
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Table 4: Existing Losses Carried Forward and Tax Rate Elasticity of Investments 
   .(1)  .(2)  .(3)  .(4)  .(5)  .(6)  .(7) 
ln (Fixed Assetst‐1)  .402***  .402***  .403***  .404***  .405***  .403***  .403*** 
 (.036)   (.036)   (.036)   (.036)   (.036)   (.036)   (.036) 
Tax Rate   ‐.325***   ‐.324***   ‐.403***   ‐.323***   ‐.399***   ‐.406***   ‐.396***
 (.123)   (.123)   (.127)   (.123)   (.127)   (.128)   (.127) 
LCFExists      ‐.013   ‐.093**   ‐.018**   ‐.094**   ‐.100***   ‐.137** 
    (.010)   (.048)   (.009)   (.048)   (.049)   (.058) 
(Tax Rate) x (LCF Exists)        .244**     .235*  .250**  .363** 
       (.144)      (.144)   (.145)   (.174) 
Mintax           .007  .003 
          (.024)   (.024) 
(Mintax) x (LCF Exists)           .023  .132 
          (.023)   (.091) 
(Mintax) x (LCF Exists)               ‐.340 
x (Tax Rate)              (.277) 
LRI  .056  .054  .054  .057  .057  .053  .054 
 (.064)   (.064)   (.065)   (.064)   (.065)   (.065)   (.065) 
Former Profit  .018***  .016**  .017***     .017***  .017*** 
 (.007)   (.007)   (.007)      (.007)   (.007) 
ln (GDP)  ‐.440  ‐.425  ‐.419  ‐.434  ‐.429  ‐.435  ‐.413 
 (.369)   (.369)   (.369)   (.369)   (.369)   (.368)   (.369) 
ln (GDPperCapita)  .953**  .937***  .928***  .947**  .940**  .946***  .924** 
 (.370)   (.371)   (.371)   (.370)   (.370)   (.370)   (.370) 
Inflation Rate  .035*  .035*  .035*  .035*  .035*  .035*  .035* 
 (.021)   (.021)   (.020)   (.021)   (.021)   (.021)  (.021) 
Country Risk   ‐.036***   ‐.036***   ‐.035***   ‐.035***   ‐.035***   ‐.037***   ‐.037***
 (.010)   (.010)   (.010)   (.010)   (.010)   (.010)   (.010) 
Observations  51,933  51,933  51,933  51,933  51,933  51,933  51,933 
Subsidiaries  10,677  10,677  10,677  10,677  10,677  10,677  10,677 
Number of IVs  62  63  64  62  63  66  67 
AR(1) – test  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
AR(2) – test  0.831  0.819  0.812  0.779  0.772  0.818  0.828 
Hansen J‐test  0.168  0.170  0.165  0.162  0.157  0.165  0.173 
Dependent Variable: ln (Fixed Assets). Year dummies for 1997-2007 are included but not reported. Estimations 
in first differences follow Arellano and Bond (1991). Robust standard errors, using the Windmeijer (2005) 
correction, are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** show significance at the level of 10%, 5% and 1 % 
respectively. Numbers reported for the Hansen J-test of overidentification restrictions and for the test of 2nd order 
auto-correlation (AR(2)) are p-values. 
 
Regression Results 
 
The results of the panel estimations are shown in Table 4. In column (1) we start with a base 
regression which equals specification (1) in Table 2 from Section 4.1. Thereafter, we take into 
account the existence of a loss carryforward in columns (2) - (5). The control variables show 
effects which are very similar to the results shown in Section 4.1.  
 
Concerning the statements in Hypothesis 5, our empirical results suggest that the liquidity and 
signaling effects dominate the tax effect. An existing tax loss carryforward results in lower 
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investments in the periods to follow. The significant coefficients for an existing loss 
carryforward of about -0.14 in column (7), for example, suggests that investments measured 
by the stock of fixed assets are by about 14% lower if a loss carryforward is present as 
compared to a situation in which it was not present. This can be attributed to a liquidity effect 
or a signaling effect if the business activities generated losses in the past. One might argue 
that a subsidiary of a multinational group should not fall short of liquidity given its ability to 
demand funds from the parent company. Still, in this case the negative signal of a loss persists 
and might have a detrimental effect on the readiness of the CEO to go on investing in the 
respective subsidiary.  
 
While we find a negative effect of taxes on investment decisions in general, columns (3) and 
(5) show that the tax effect is significantly smaller in absolute values if a subsidiary is still 
carrying forward losses. The interaction term between the statutory corporate income tax rate 
and a dummy variable indicating an existing loss carryforward is positive. This confirms our 
theoretical expectations outlined in Hypothesis 6. Once a loss carryfoward exists, future 
profits remain effectively untaxed as long as this loss carryforward can be utilized. In the 
estimation presented in column (5), the tax rate coefficient amounts to -0.372 and the 
interaction term between tax rate and the dummy indicating an existing loss carryforward is 
0.297. This means that the presence of losses absorbs almost the entire negative tax rate 
effect, leaving only a negligible difference. This result confirms exactly what, for instance, 
Creedy and Gemmel (2008) have worked out analytically. It is plausible that the tax rate 
effect is not entirely counterbalanced because the size of the loss carryforward might not 
suffice to absorb all future profits and furthermore, as discussed above, in many countries loss 
carryforwards expire after some years.   
 
Finally, columns (6) and (7) regard the impact of a minimum taxation rule. Based on 
Hypothesis 6, we would expect a counterbalancing effect for the impact of an existing loss 
carryforward on the tax rate elasticity of investments if a minimum taxation rule is applied. 
We are unable to identify any statistically significant effect of the minimum tax rule. The 
results, however, should be interpreted with caution since the empirical variation in the 
minimum tax rules is very limited in our data.   
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6.  Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
 
We have analyzed the investment impact of tax loss treatment using data of subsidiaries of 
multinational firms. First, we have focused on the treatment of potential losses. Regarding the 
impact of tax loss offset regulations on the size of investments, we generally find significant 
effects of provisions to offset profits and losses across affiliated firms. Moreover, we find 
significant effects of the intertemporal loss offset provision when paying particular attention 
to the probability of making losses. Based on our estimation results, a limitation of the 
maximum loss carryforward to five or less years has a detrimental effect on investments of a 
subsidiary in a generally risky industry. We are, however, unable to identify statistically 
significant effects of the possibility to carry a loss back to previous periods. Furthermore, our 
results suggest that the structures of investments are significantly affected by the existence of 
a group taxation regime. Multinationals seem to consider whether or not netting of profits and 
losses is possible when deciding on how to structure their investments in a host country. 
 
Secondly, we have analyzed the impact of existing loss carryforwards on investments. 
Liquidity or signaling effects seem to exceed tax based profitability considerations which 
results in lower investments once loss carryforwards are present. Yet, we find a significantly 
reduced tax elasticity of investments for companies actually shielded by existing losses. The 
negative impact of a high corporate tax rate almost completely vanishes if a firm has a loss 
carryforward. 
 
Given that many countries have changed their tax loss offset rules during the last decade, the 
regression results are generally interesting for policy-makers. Our empirical results suggest 
that companies indeed factor tax loss treatment into their investment decisions. This holds for 
firms which expect potential future losses and for firms which have existing losses. Hence, 
the basic question arises whether host countries should offer more favorable or less favorable 
rules to carry forward losses. When all companies face the risk of making losses but have not 
made them so far, generous tax treatment of carryforwards benefits investments and the time 
until loss carryforwards forfeit should not be too short. If some subsidiaries, however, already 
had losses in the past, these firms make their investment decisions based on existing loss 
carryforwards. Then the policy implication is not as straight forward. On the one hand, the 
existence of a loss carryforward is favorable, particularly in high-tax countries as the reduced 
tax rate elasticity of investments can channel additional foreign direct investments to the 
respective subsidiary. For example, if we suppose a tax rate of about 30%, the estimates of 
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column (3) in Table 4 suggest that the negative investment effect in the presence of a loss 
carryforward is almost completely offset by the significantly smaller detrimental effect of the 
tax rate.25 On the other hand, a generous recognition of losses for tax purposes can distort the 
competition between those companies with and those without a loss carryforward because the 
former benefit from windfall profits which are paradoxically caused by their failure in the 
past. Thus, for the sake of fair competition, tax loss carryforwards should not be allowed to 
persist indefinitely. Therefore, restricting the maximum number of years until losses carried 
forward expire may not only be a good idea from a fiscal perspective. What is more, our 
results regarding the impact of the tax loss treatment on investment decisions of firms which 
will potentially make losses in the future suggest that a moderate restriction of the maximum 
time losses can be carried forward does not exert significant negative effects on investments.26 
 
Besides the intertemporal loss offset, we have also analyzed intersubjective means of netting 
profits and losses. According to our results, a clear policy implication can be formulated for 
this case: Group taxation regimes have a significant positive investment effect. Quite 
naturally, only one out of 41 countries has abolished its group taxation rule since 1996 and six 
have even introduced one. In this light, countries without a group taxation regime so far might 
want to reconsider their policy. Interestingly, the European Commission has recently 
proposed to replace the prevailing international tax base allocation with a common 
consolidated tax base. The consolidation procedure would introduce a general European 
group taxation regime. Our results suggest that this could exert significant positive effects on 
investments of multinationals. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 Considering estimates of column (3) in Table 4, a loss carryforward exerts a negative effect of about -0.093 
but also an offsetting effect of about 0.073 if we suppose a tax rate of about 30%. 
26 This can be seen from the results in column 9 of Table 2. A severe restriction of the loss carryforward shows a 
highly significant negative effect on the investments of companies facing a considerable possibility to suffer 
losses. By contrast, there is no statistically significant investment impact of a broad limit as compared to an 
unlimited loss carryforward.  
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Annex 
Table 5: Maximum Loss Carryforward 
Country Loss CF 1996   Change  to Change  to Change  to Loss CF 2007 
Australia ∞                    ∞ 
Austria 7 1998 ∞      ∞ 
Belgium 4 1997 ∞      ∞ 
Brazil ∞      ∞ 
Bulgaria 5        5 
Canada 7 2005 10 2007 20    20 
China 5        5 
Cyprus 5 2003 ∞      ∞ 
Czech Republic 7 2004 5      5 
Denmark 5 2002 ∞      ∞ 
Estonia 5 2000 7      7 
Finland 10        10 
France 5 2004 ∞      ∞ 
Greece 5      5 
Hungary 5 2004 ∞      ∞ 
Iceland 8 2004 9 2005 10    10 
India 8        8 
Ireland ∞      ∞ 
Italy 5        5 
Japan 5 2002 7    7 
Latvia 5        5 
Lithuania 0 1998 3 1999 5    5 
Luxembourg ∞        ∞ 
Malta ∞        ∞ 
Mexico 10        10 
Netherlands ∞ 2007 9      9 
New Zealand ∞        ∞ 
Norway 10 2006 ∞      ∞ 
Poland 3 1999 5      5 
Portugal 6        6 
Romania 2 1997 3 1998 5    5 
Russia 5 2002 10      10 
Slovak Republic 5        5 
Slovenia 5 2006 7 2007 ∞    ∞ 
South Korea 5        5 
Spain 5 1997 7 1999 10 2002 15 15 
Sweden ∞        ∞ 
Switzerland 7        7 
Turkey 5        5 
United Kingdom ∞        ∞ 
USA 15 1998  20                  20 
The table shows the number of years an unused loss carryforward can persist. The symbol ∞ means that loss 
carryforwards do not expire at all. The second and the sixth column show the regulation in the respective country 
for the years 1996 and 2007, while the columns in between reveal when the changes took place. A dash means 
that there has been no further change as compared to the value presented in the previous column. In Austria for 
example, unused loss carryforwards forfeited after seven years in 1996. This limit has been abolished in 1998. 
29 
 
 
Table 6: Existence of Minimum Taxation 
Country Minimum Tax 1996          Change             to Minimum Tax 2007 
Austria no            2001               yes yes 
Brazil yes yes 
Poland yes yes 
Russian Federation yes            2007                 no no 
Slovak Republic yes            2005                 no no 
USA yes yes 
The table presents an overview of those countries which apply a form of minimum taxation. Changes in the
application of the rules are shown in column three. In Austria, for example, there had not been a minimum
taxation rule in 1996, but it was introduced in 2001 and still in effect in 2007. All countries of our sample
which are not shown here do not have a minimum taxation in the entire time span of 1996-2007. 
 
 
Table 7: Maximum Loss Carryback 
Country Loss Carryback 1996          Change         to Loss Carryback 2007
Canada 3 3 
Ireland 1 1 
Netherlands 3           2007               1 1 
Sweden 0           1999               6 6 
United Kingdom 3           1998               1 1 
USA 3           1998               2                   2 
The table presents an overview of those countries which grant resident companies to carry back a loss. The 
columns show the maximum number of years losses could be carried back. Changes are reported in column 
two. All countries not shown here do not provide for a loss carryback in the entire timespan of 1996-2007. 
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Table 8: Method of Group Taxation 
Country 1996 Method in 1996 Change  to 2007 
Australia yes Group Contribution 2002  Consolidation yes 
Austria yes Fiscal Unity    yes 
Belgium no    no 
Brazil no      no 
Bulgaria no      no 
Canada no      no 
China no      no 
Cyprus no   2003 Group Relief yes 
Czech Republic no      no 
Denmark yes Consolidation    yes 
Estonia yes      yes 
Finland yes Group Contribution    yes 
France yes Fiscal Unity    yes 
Greece no      no 
Hungary no      no 
Iceland no   1999 Consolidation yes 
India no      no 
Ireland yes Group Relief    yes 
Italy yes TaxCredit Exchange 2000 Group Contribution yes 
     2004 Consolidation yes 
Japan no   2002 Consolidation yes 
Latvia no   1998 Group Relief yes 
Lithuania no   2004 Group Contribution yes 
Luxembourg yes Fiscal Unity    yes 
Malta yes Group Relief    yes 
Mexico yes Consolidation    yes 
Netherlands yes Consolidation    yes 
New Zealand yes Group Relief    yes 
Norway yes Group Contribution    yes 
Poland no   1997 FiscalUnity yes 
Portugal yes Consolidation    yes 
Romania no      no 
Russian Federation no      no 
Slovak Republic no      no 
Slovenia yes Consolidation 2007 no no 
South Korea no      no 
Spain yes Consolidation    yes 
Sweden yes Group Contribution    yes 
Switzerland yes      yes 
Turkey yes      yes 
United Kingdom yes Group Relief    yes 
USA yes Consolidation     yes 
In a consolidation or fiscal unity system, the financial statements of companies belonging to the same group 
are either made up together or merged at the end of the fiscal year. When there is a system of group 
contribution, the profitable subsidiary is enabled to contribute a part or all of its profits to the subsidiary 
which suffered a loss. Correspondingly, losses are transferred among subsidiaries in a group relief system. In 
effect, all of these systems enable the netting of profits and losses of different tax subjects. Therefore, we 
apply a dummy variable if some kind of group taxation is available or not.  
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